There has been talk amongst some of late about women being under-represented within academic philosophy. My intuition about this has been that women generally do not find philosophy (at least how it is done within academia) interesting enough to follow through. Some do, but most do not. Men, on the other hand, find it to be (in general terms) engaging. What's more, men are stoopid enough not to care too much about the lack of opportunities that (esp. at the postgraduate level) philosophy engenders.
Anyways, on this issue new research has been posted up on Leiter:
http://leiterreports.typepad.com/blog/2010/09/gender-and-philosophical-intuition.html
check out the paper, it is very interesting.
As I assumed, women generally do not have similar intuitions as men. But what is elucidating is the fact that this difference in intuitions is significantly different in respects to typical analytic philosophy thought experiments. A hypothesis that is discussed is that this discrepancy of intuition leaves many women thinking they are not good at philosophy and begin to drop off. Hence, why at later years the ratio of students favours men.
The question that I think arises here is whether philosophy itself is biased towards men. Does this need to change?
My own answer to this question is no. I think philosophy as it is done is useful. Yes, women are under-represented. This is not ideal, but we cannot force women to do philosophy. (We should however encourage them as much as is practically possible). If women are drawn to other academic disciplines then they can engage in the academic discourse there. (Maybe even engage philosophic discourse that is more 'intuition-friendly' to women). If the whole of academia is biased against women I would be highly critical, but if it not I find it quite okay for women to follow academic interests in areas other than philosophy.
I look forward to a discussion here.
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ReplyDeleteThe paper suggests the hypothesis that due to differing intuitions by men and women, women who do not have the same intuitions as philosophy expects finds that they cannot engage with the debate. (It is explained quite carefully and well in the paper). It is only a hypothesis that claims no correlation but does suggest one. And I do think this is quite likely, to disagree with your first point Lachlan.
ReplyDeleteIt makes sense. When beginning a number of different classes and you get bad marks in one, you are likely to drop that one before all others (e.g. anthropology for myself back in undergrad).
Now commenting on your terms aggression and argument, I think these need a little moderation. 'Argument' is a technical term. Most people use argument for raised voices and personal attacks, where in philosophy its meant to be closer to critical discussion. In this way I worry about your x-phil experiment.
Now in undergrad I do not think that philosophy focuses more on critical discussion than other disciplines, its just that this discussion goes further (into the questions of the nature of the assumptions other disciplines take as given). So I do not think it 'aggressive'. What's more philosophers are more sensitive to ad hominem attacks (i.e. attacks against the person rather than argument), and unlike other disciplines (at least I would hope this is the case) be able to pick up attacks on others and dismiss them as fallacious.
Lachlan I think there is some merit in what you have outlined but these are more issues of postgrad rather than undergrad. In undergrad there is not a culture of 'tearing one down' and there is a focus on cultivating and developing the student.
I will be upfront. I have not read the article on Leiter's blog as yet (but will hope to do so when I can find the time!), but I do have some thoughts:
ReplyDeleteFrom my experience, I think that there is a great difference between men and women in how they naturally think. No doubt (at least, I do not doubt it) this has come from many years of social conditioning. I also think that as women escape from the oppression of men, these two ways of thinking will converge somewhat.
I think that one factor in this difference is due to women personalising things more than men do. So, when men argue, they are arguing about a certain point (their persona is by and large irrelevant), but when women argue it is as much their self as it is the point that is on the line.
Why is this? My thoughts about this are that men think more in abstract terms than women do. So whereas men think in general terms and then apply it to particular instances, women think in particular instances and then generalise from these instances to speak in general terms.
Is this right? We might try to conduct a genealogy of the difference between men and women’s thinking. (Something I obviously cannot do here.) Whatever such a genealogy might look like, it would have to take into account the oppression of women and their social role in the home and society. My suspicion is that this would reveal that women generally personalise things to thereby enhance their chance of survival, whereas men, being relatively safe and secure in their environment, had the luxury of being able to think in general and abstract terms.
So, is analytic philosophy biased toward men? I think the answer is yes. But the ‘answer’ may be that women’s thinking is too immature to do philosophy. But here a danger lurks. Perhaps a better way to look at it is that philosophy is not yet ready for ‘the woman’. It is too old, too brittle, too dinosaur like.
Where to now? Adaptation? We might call this the feminine revolt in philosophy, whereby philosophy as we now know it becomes a kind of hybrid system, consisting in the synthesis of men and women’s ways of thinking. Or perhaps we should go for isolation...
My point: those who give an affirmative answer to the question of whether philosophy itself is biased towards men should opt for adaptation; those who give a negative answer to the question of whether philosophy itself is biased towards men have OPTED IN for isolation.
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ReplyDeleteLachlan, just to clear something up, I do agree with you that I should read Cordelia Fine's book. I also agree that female and male thinking do converge at different points, but I would decline to call these 'exceptions': there are no exceptions, just different degrees. When I mentioned a genealogy, I said a genealogy of the difference between men and women’s thinking. This is not a difference in the genetics of men and women. I am talking about a social phenomena. But I disagree that it is 'something which develops due to the nature of our society now'. I think any such ahistorical view is (dangerously) wrong. I think it can only be understood in its historical context.
ReplyDeleteOne final point. I certainly agree that my argument was overly general. (And I quote:) 'However, I take great pleasure in arguing with others in these situations even when I know I'm probably wrong' (Doughney, 30/9/2010).
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ReplyDeleteI think Lachlan makes a good point about the fault lying with teachers rather than the practice of philosophy itself. If men's intuitions tend to align more and ends up making women feel like they aren't getting philosophy, then this is an indictment of how philosophy is presently carried out. Intuition-mongering has replaced actual argumentation, and it's the reinforcement of those intuitions without critical scrutiny that is, if at all, the greater contributor to the inequality of gender representation in philosophy.
ReplyDeleteOn the other hand, I am worried that Lachlan is putting too much emphasis on attitudes towards argumentation and their relevance to practical reform. If women tend to take arguing personally, as you suggest they do on average, then I would be prepared to say they aren't good at philosophy or any academic discipline. If someone were to put forward an interpretation of a film and then have someone strongly disagree for evidential reasons, if the person had an emotional reaction and took the criticism personally, then she would be equally bad at cinema studies. It is not the discipline that matters, it is the very form of academic research that is at stake. Intellectual pursuits require great amounts of time and effort in constructing a theory/argument/interpretation and the development of an identity with the theory is not surprising. However, it is also part of the very same process to be faced with competing views that would drastically undermine one's own beliefs. If the person cannot handle this part of the process, then academia or any kind of public role may not be a suitable occupation.
Unless it can be shown that the way philosophy is undertaken currently, with its emphasis on argumentation, is an unreliable practice that would benefit from a change in direction, a direction that is uniquely feminine or at least predominant amongst women, then the lack of women in philosophy, assuming no outright discrimination, is not a problem. It is only because the value of equality for its own sake has been hammered into us that this has become an issue of importance.