Leiter on 'Continental Philosophy'

This is an old blog posting (2009) on Leiter's Neitzsche Blog about 'Continental Philosophy', While I agree with his expose of the 'Anonymous Blogger' that 'Continental philosophy' should not be wholly interweaved with the post-modernist philosophical agenda (of which I think he wrongly puts Derrida and Foucault into this category), but I cannot agree with him that the 'Continental Tradition' is not a 'tradition' at all. I think Leiter misunderstands the idea of tradition, and I think one can see from the "passing down" of methodological processes such as Dialectics (in Hegel and Marx), Kant's arguments from trancendentals and more contemporaneously, Deconstruction and Geneology, that such a tradition exists.

Thoughts and comments?

Methodological Individualism.

Hey Guys, This is part of a paper I presented at the Latrobe Philosophy Post-graduate seminar series, working on a few form for it and wondering if you could offer any assistance, criticisms, glaring holes which I may not have covered.

Given the caricature of analytical philosophy as those obsessed with the construction of an argument to the minute detail it seems to follow that one of the largest debates within this phenomenon of Marxist theory concerns methodological practise. Such a debate situates itself within the problems of methodological individualism and methodological collectivism[1], the former methodological process has in many ways become the unofficial flagship of Analytical Marxism, while the latter is said to be overused in the Continental tradition of Marxist theory. In this section we shall discuss the idea of methodological individualism and its relation to analytical Marxism. However before we discuss the relational value that methodological individualism holds with analytical Marxism we need to provide an account of what methodological individualism is, In order to do this I will turn to the writings of Torbjorn Tannsjo, John Roemer and Jon Elster, the last two being the leading proponents of methodological individualism for analytical Marxism[2]. Torbjorn Tannsjo in the article Methodological Individualism (1990) lays out a number of different definitions of the term methodological individualism. In the first instance, Tannsjo takes methodological individualism (MI) to explain social phenomena in individual terms, a point that both Elster and Roemer can agree upon. However in Tannsjo objective to find out whether (MI) is compatible with functionalism, structuralism and Marxism (Tannsjo, 1990) He focuses on what he calls the argument in defence of Methodological Individualism, or Epistemic Individualism[3] . There are two forms that Epistemic Individualism can take

1. Strong Epistemic Individualism (SEI) where social phenomena can ONLY be explained in individual terms.
2. Weak Epistemic Individualism (WEI) where social phenomena can BEST be explained in individual terms

It seems prima facie that an argument for Strong Epistemic Individualism cannot succeed in relations to criticisms. In order to understand what side of (MI) Elster and Roemer are situated on, it is apparent that we must discuss the comments that they have made in relation to this subject, on methodological Individualism.

In what has become Jon Elster’s most important contribution to the phenomena of analytical Marxism, Making Sense of Marx (1985) comes out of his commitment to the methodological processes on the social sciences, within its opening pages he sets out what he thinks is a correct analysis of Marxian concepts using such a process as methodological Individualism by which he means

“the doctrine that all social phenomena – their structure and their change – are in principle explicable in ways that only involve individuals – their properties, their goals, their beliefs and their actions” (Elster, p.5)

He holds that this sort of methodological tool can only be put into practice when in participation with extensional contexts – that a process like methodological individualism can only be applied to concepts whose meaning lies in its extension, Elster gives an example of this

“People often have beliefs about supra-individual entities that are not reducible to beliefs about individuals. “the Capitalists fear the working class” cannot be reduced to statements about the feelings of capitalists about individual workers, while “The capitalist profit is threatened by the working class” can be reduced to a complex statement about the consequences of actions taken by individual workers.” (Elster, p.6)

Such is Elster’s definition of methodological individualism[4] that it allows room for the irreducibility of social phenomena to the individual level that it fits with Tannsjo definition of a weak methodological individualist[5]. In turning to Roemer’s work on methodological individualism, we find a similar argument to that of Elster

“…in constructing arguments to explain social phenomena, it is necessary to explain the actions of individuals as resulting from their attempt to further their interests, as they see them – or, using economic terminology, aggregate behaviour must fundamentally be explained as the consequence of individual utility maximization.” (Roemer, p.352)

Roemer thinks that methodological individualism is a necessary reason for proper explanation of social phenomena; he does not think there is a sufficient reason for explanation of all social phenomena, which put him, with Elster, and perhaps other methodological individualists in the category of a weak methodological individualism.

One thing that happens to be problematic with methodological Individualism is Elster’s view that is

“Difficult to argue for it because it is difficult to understand how anyone could disagree wit it” (Elster, 295)

Putting aside his assumption that methodological individualism is true regardless of the many criticisms that have been expounded upon it, In Marxism and Individualism (1989) Elster puts forward three arguments for what he calls the desirability of scientific reductionism in general and for methodological individualism in particular. The arguments for desirability that Elster puts forward can be considered as follows (1) aesthetic reasons, (2) Confidence (3) necessity to understand the stability and change of aggregates. Elster argues that a situation may be ‘confidently’ explained through the use of macro-phenomena, but this cannot ‘satisfy’ our own curiosity about the phenomena. The rate of unemployment at t2 can be explained by the rate of inflation at t1, however according to Elster our curiosity forces us to look further into the matter by asking how inflation generates unemployment. Methodological Individualism seen in this way, as being aesthetically desirable, however seems to lead us to an almost infinite amount of questions pushed by our curiosity, leading us to an almost atomistic explanation of any social phenomena. Atomism marks one of the explanatory methods that is used within social scientific research, others being radical holism, methodological individualism and anti-reductionism[6]. Atomism is a methodological process that denies that relations- whether between individuals or between social entities – are ever genuinely explanatory (Wright et al., p. 109) while it may sound implausible, a counter to this may be that one cannot explain anything without reference to the social relations of the situation, the atomist may argue that the explanation is only explanatory because of the corresponding (non-relational) psychological states of these individuals. The problem with atomism is that it does not want to take into account that the way we think and believe things is heavily dependant on the social relationships we have with the world and in this way we cannot explain the way of social phenomena without some sort of reference to outside the ‘psychological states’ of the individual.

This may even lead to us to making the assumption that we can never fully explain any phenomena between individuals or between social entities, that is to say that an atomist would argue that everything that seems explanatory about the irreducible relations between individuals actually is explanatory only because of the corresponding (non-relational) psychological states of these individuals (Wright et al. 1987). The problem with the atomist position is its denial of the social situations that the individual is in to cause such psychological states to take place. As we have already seen how Elster does not want to commit himself to any explanation that reduces itself further then what may be explained by weak epistemic individualism, it seems that he cannot himself hold to this argument for the ‘desirability towards aesthetic reasons’. Elster may try to save himself from criticisms against his own argument from desirability by adding the clause that people might have to end up being satisfied with an explanation which doesn’t totally deliver on an explanation from Individualist action, that Methodological Individualism is an ideal whose value is that of pointing in a certain direction (Elster, 1985) However I do not see how this could be of any value, Elster speaks about curiosity and then inserts that we may have to be satisfied with certain results. This does not cure the curiosity of the situation, but merely puts a lid on it, I seek no other way of handling Elster’s argument by saying that it’s only way out is through atomism, which Elster does not want to commit himself to. Elster’s second argument for methodological individualism is that it improves our confidence in an alleged explanation, our beliefs that it does not rest on a spurious, non-explanatory explanation (Elster, 1989).

Elster’s second argument for methodological Individualism pertains to the boost to our confidence through an alleged explanation. Elster says that the temporal intervals between macro-phenomena are “empirically” longer then those that happen between micro-phenomena. Methodological Individualism allows for this temporal gap to be closed allowing for a more confident explanation

“By reducing the time span between explanans and explanandum, the risk of spurious explanation is also reduced. The latter risk arises in two main ways: by confusion of explanation and correlation and by the confusion of explanation and necessitation” (Elster, 196)

These risks occurs when (1) there is a third variable that generates both apparent cause and the apparent effect

(2) When the effect is brought about by some other cause that pre-empts the operation of the apparent cause.

In Elster’s ideal situation of using methodological individualism, both risks are reduced through approaching a continuous chain of cause and effect (Elster, 1989). This however seems to lead us into the same problem that we encountered in the first argument. The idea that confidence in one’s explanation should govern our ability to provide explanation just does not sit well within the confines of a methodological individualist schema, Just as the ‘aesthetic reason’ for using methodological individualism leads us to a atomist position, so to is our confidence in explanation. If by confidence, Elster means that the shorter the temporal intervals between phenomenal situations are more easily explained, then the most confidence in an explanation of social phenomena would be gained through the atomist position. The final argument that we shall examine of Elster’s in favour of methodological individualism is that a reduction of the social phenomena to individual actions is necessary to understand the stability and change of aggregates. Once again however, Elster fails to take into account that he cannot make these claims without fearing a reduction to an atomist account of explanation. While Jon Elster believes fundamentally that such a methodological process as methodological individualism is true, his arguments for why it is true fail to argue for methodological individualism itself, but argue instead for a reductionist explanation of social phenomena, the most radical of which is atomism; which all his arguments seem to be deducible to. if we look at the types of micro-foundations that they see as present within explanation of social phenomena, is not that a methodological individualism is wrong to conclude the many factors that it does conclude, but merely to say that given the multiple types of explanations that can be given through micro-foundation, it seems unreasonable to suggest that explanations should be removed if they do not conform to a methodological individualist model.

The idea that the social sciences should be concerned more with how the methodology that is being used makes sense in evidence of empirical data is found in Functionalism Vs. Rational Choice by Johannes Berger and Claus Offe, as a rejoinder to the debate between Cohen and Elster on the correct methodological process to use (in this case between Functional explanation and methodological Individualism) Berger and Offe argue firstly that methodological debates remain without a foundation if they are primarily being argued for strictly from methodology (Berger & Offe, 1982) but secondly it is important to understand why the argument is being made. The justification for the use of certain methodologies cannot be guaranteed upon theoretical analysis alone, but needs to be seen within the context of empirical data, however unfortunately we sometimes are not in a position to work with such empirical data and we must focus alone on theoretical analysis. In closing, while analytical Marxism identifies a useful path in the exploration of Marxian theory in explaining contemporary social phenomena, questions still need to be asked about its relation with the methodological process it uses in this exploration, specifically around questions about methodological individualism. In this paper I tried to point out that the assumptions made by Roemer and Elster about methodological Individualism fall short of their goal as a convincing argument made about the use of methodological individualism, and that such assumptions are a poor indication of its use. I think that the analytical Marxists are correct in identifying the substantive in Marx as what is fundamentally important, but this does not allow us to move away from critical engagement with methodological practices, and in many cases the question about methodology is the most crucial question to be asked.

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[1] The debate within Analytical Marxism on methodological individualism can be thought of a continuation of the positivist debate that occurred in the 1950s between the Critical Rationalists and the Frankfurt School, What may be interesting to note is Elster’s admission that “most social scientists and social philosophers have come to accept the view as the truism it is” (Elster, 193) I do not share Elster’s enthusiasm for the truism of methodological individualism and view it as deeply flawed in many respects, some of which will be viewed in this paper.

[2] Elster and Roemer both find their rationale for providing a Marxian theory based on micro-foundations, that is one based on the analysis of the behaviour of individual actors, on a critique of the functionalism they say has perverted Marxian theory.

[3] While Torbjorn Tannsjo uses the phrasing Epistemic Individualism to describe the explanation of social phenomena to the level on the individual, I do not see how it differs from Methodological Individualism, as such I will continue to use methodological individualism unless referencing the material by Tannsjo. Elster uses the term interchangeable in his article Marxism and Individualism (1989)

[4] Elster also, in Marxism and Individualism (1989), wants to distinguish between political individualism and methodological individualism. Taking Schumpeter’s (1908) definition of political individualism that freedom contributes more than anything else to the development of man and to the general good is independent of methodological individualism “in the sense that all combinations of acceptance and rejection of the two are possible and coherent” (Elster, p201)

[5] Even without this quote from Elster’s Making Sense of Marx (1985) Elster can not be seen as a strong methodological individualist, if we turn once again to his article Marxism and Individualism he thinks that “an absurd and untenable version of MI is the view that social science could in principle eliminate all references to social wholes, collectivises, systems and the like. The objection to this view is well known and simple. When social aggregates are the object of individual beliefs and desires, one cannot always substitute, salva veritate, co-extensional individual referents” (Elster, 193)

[6] We have already to some extent explained what methodological individualism is, and later in the paper will be defining and reviewing what anti-reductionism is. Radical holism can be perhaps best explained as the anti-thesis to methodological individualism. Essentially, a radical holist will want to argue that individual relations are epiphenomenal in character that is they are a secondary characteristic of the explanation from a social level.

A Companion to Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand

Some of you may have already seen this, but for those that haven't, it's a pretty good reference that can be consulted online for free. The 'La Trobe' entry written by Brian Ellis is really good, and I think should be used by the department in future negotiations with the administration to stress the foundational role that philosophy has played at La Trobe and plays within the humanities at large. If the lecturers are treated better by giving them incentives to stay, then a lot of the big names wouldn't have left for higher profile departments, which really means departments that attract lecturers. According to the article, La Trobe used to be the biggest department in Australia, and there is no reason that we can't bring back some of that glory!

Epiphenomenalism

I was hoping that someone might be able to give me a hand with a problem I am having.

I am struggling with epiphenomenalism. The usual ‘definition’ is that epiphenomenalism says that consciousness, or mental events, is causally inert and all that does the ‘pushing and shoving’ are physical events (such as neural processes and other purely physical events). Consciousness just comes along for the ride.

We can break this down into type- and token-epiphenomenalism. Both kinds of epiphenomenalism hold that there are only physical causes and that there are no mental causes. However, type-epiphenomenalism holds that mental events might cause something, but only in virtue of some underlying physical cause, such as a particular neural process. Token epiphenomenalism, on the other hand, denies that mental events play ANY part in the causal chain.

Okay. What I need to know is in what sense mental events are said to be acausal for the epiphenomenalist. The problem is that there seem to be two ways mental events can have a causal impact. One way has it that they are INTERNAL to the workings of the mind, the other is that they are EXTERNAL to the workings of the mind. Here is an analogy: suppose I am driving a car and I swerve to avoid a tree. Here, the tree plays a causal role in the TOTAL causal story (if the tree were not there I would not have swerved), but in another sense it does not: it plays no part in explaining the processes that went on to make the car swerve. The latter causal story mentions ONLY the driver’s actions and the mechanics of the car. To draw the analogy, the tree plays only an external causal role to the workings of the structural system, viz. the driver and the car.

A similar story can be told with respect to mental events or consciousness. Suppose, for example, that I come to some conscious decision; say, that . There are two ways I can see conscious mental states playing a role here. The first one is that they are internal to the causal story. In this way I have a certain group of conscious mental states—such as , , and so on—which I internally process to come to the conclusion that . Here, these mental states play an internal causal role. But it seems possible that these conscious mental states play only an external causal role. Here, I would unconsciously come to the ‘conclusion’ that by unconsciously reflecting upon these conscious states. So these conscious mental states play a part in the TOTAL causal story, but they are like the tree: to explain the structural system, viz. the workings of the mind, one needs only to refer to the unconscious mental states.

Basically, I do not know whether the theory of epiphenomenalism denies that conscious mental states play ANY causal role (i.e. internal or external) or whether they deny that they play any INTERNAL causal role.

On the other hand, perhaps this makes little sense. Any help and/or suggestions would be great (stop writing on ‘We know what Penguins eat’ being a valid one!).