Nietzsche and the analytics

When one thinks about what Nietzsche has to say about ethics—that is, when one spends the time to really think about what he is saying—one can’t help but think that ethicists have something to answer for. For if Nietzsche is correct in what he says, then the ethics we currently practice is in all sorts of trouble, not to mention the analytic philosophers who talk about ethics. Their (the analytic philosophers) general assumption that this phenomena we call ‘ethics’ is in some way legitimate, or ‘good practice’, or ‘beneficial toward life’, or whatever, seems in all sorts of trouble. But there doesn’t seem to be a direct answer to Nietzsche.

Is this a problem? Foot (1978), for example, thinks not: she says that we can dismiss Nietzsche (or at least most of Nietzsche) due to the dependency his project has on his doctrine of ‘will to power’. She thinks that any wholesale description of human motivation is bound to fail, and she casts doubt on someone like Nietzsche (the solitary genius) having any great insights into the motivations of the general population. I have doubts over Foot’s ‘get out of jail free’ card she is playing here. I think her real problem is captured in the following quote: ‘a confrontation with Nietzsche is a difficult thing to arrange [because] [w]e find it hard to know where we could meet him because of the intrinsically puzzling nature of a project such as his’ (Foot 1978, p. 82).

What I am exploring—and I would love some feedback on this—is what sort of confrontation there might be between analytic philosophers and Nietzsche. In particular, I am thinking of the confrontation between Nietzsche and Leiter’s (1997, p. 285) Anglo-American philosophers (in the quote below):

It would be neither surprising nor unreasonable for Anglo- American philosophers to express doubts about their competence to undertake or assess such a critical project: such a "philosophical" undertaking—if that is what it deserves to be called—brings to mind a very different conception of philosophy, in which reflection is manifestly not a priori and analysis is not merely "conceptual" or, in this post-Quinean world, simply the a posteriori handmaiden of the natural and social sciences. In its Nietzschean incarnation, philosophy quickly crosses the line into psychology, cultural anthropology, and social critique—territory now occupied (regrettably) almost exclusively by literary theorists.

So I am thinking of the analytic philosopher as one who is mainly concerned with conceptual analysis. And I see that there might be a confrontation between Nietzsche and the analytics in this regard. For if Nietzsche has done anything it is to (re-)identify some (or perhaps most) of our value-concepts. So, say I, it is by concentrating on this aspect of Nietzsche that a direct confrontation between him and the analytics can be forged.

I have more to say on this, but I would love feedback, so I shall keep it short for the consumer! So consider what I say in the next two paragraphs as an example of Nietzsche’s ‘conceptual analysis’:

Nietzsche has a lot to say about pity (mittleid), especially in Daybreak (see sects. 131-139). His primary target is Christianity (132), and its influence on European thinking. He mentions Schopenhauer in this regard, saying that Schopenhauer thought pity was ‘the source of each and every moral action’ (133). The idea being that pity impels one to help another, for one is, at that moment, not thinking of oneself (133). But this is a mistake, Nietzsche thinks, for ‘pity’ is a ‘polyphonous… being’ (133). For Nietzsche, there are two stages in pity. In the first stage, when one sees another suffering (leid) one is not ‘thoughtlessly moved’ to assist them, but one is thinking of oneself ‘very strongly unconsciously’. This is due to our innate desire to imitate things (142). But then one enjoins the sufferer to some degree, so that the pitier, too, is suffering (cf. 134). This suffering is different from, but isomorphic to, the one who is pitied. But as one is unconsciously moved to promote one’s own well-being (cf. 108), one attempts to relieve one’s own, peculiar, suffering in some way. This is the second stage of pity, where the pitier attempts to relieve their suffering by exacting some sort of malevolent revenge on the one who is pitied (133, for a slightly different perspective, see 138). Both these stages of pity can be cashed out in many different ways (see 133 for details), such is the polyphonous nature of the value-concept: pity.

Something approaching conceptual analysis of other value-concepts is scattered throughout the Nietzschean corpus, such as love (e.g. GS 14, 345, BGE 268, Z, The second dance song), courage (D, 277, 419, 551), selfless action (e.g. D, 148, GS 21, 338, BGE 260), friendship (GS 14, BGE 27, 260), to mention a few. What complicates matters is the manner in which these critiques occur, for often a certain value-concept is critiqued as a sub-argument in a larger argument. This causes a logistical problem, rather than a logical one. But this does not destabilise the point that I have been making: there is something that verges on conceptual analysis in Nietzsche in which the analytics can (and must) engage him. I have only mentioned one such value-concept, viz. pity, and have not considered what follow-on effects such a ‘conceptual re-definition’ may have. Nietzsche certainly points to these follow-on effects, and it is these follow on effects that pose not only a cultural, but a theoretical, critique, contra Leiter.

Maybe I haven’t said enough to motivate the point, or maybe you think I have said enough but there just isn’t a point to be made. Either way, I would love some comments on this.

Have a great Christmas!

Individual rights above private institutions.

The recent events involving a ‘Private’ high School student being prevented from attending her formal because she wanted to attend this special event with her girlfriend (see story here) has sparked worldwide media coverage (here, and Here). But the question that these media stories have been avoiding is the question of whether privatized Institutions should be allowed to continue to discriminate in this way. This is the question I now pose.

The School in question, Ivanhoe Girls School, acknowledges on their site that they aim to provide “the best learning and teaching which, underpinned by the Christian philosophy, enables every girl to achieve her potential and to be a confident, optimistic and responsible citizen.” In this case, ‘Christian philosophy’ marks an important point of procedure.

It is well established, within Literature and media, that Christianity (as well as other religions based around the mono-theistic rhetoric of Judeo-Christian beliefs) are profoundly homophobic in their teachings. However given that the student had been quite open about her sexual orientation, why given the schools stance was she accepted into the institution in the first place and yet not allowed to attend an event at the school? Several reasons why the student was not permitted to attend were given by the Headmistress of the School (They are mentioned in the news articles above, I will not repeat them here) hide a prejudice which is obvious to everyone it seems but the Headmistress herself.

This brings us to the question, Should private institutions be allowed to discriminate against individuals? The ‘Victorian Equal Opportunity Act 1995’ (See Here) tells us that it is unlawful to discriminate against people because of their sexual orientation, this is in relation to areas such as ‘Employment; partnerships; firms; professional and other organisations; qualifying bodies; employment agencies; education; provision of goods and services; accommodation (including alteration of accommodation); clubs or community service organisations; municipal or shire councils.’ Now we could argue about the merits of a high school formal being part of the students education, it is my opinion that social events within the school are an important educational tool for the development of students.

The private sector in Business, education and such is so called because they get their financial support (though its hard to tell these days) from private investors. Such investments allow them to work ‘free’ from government intervention, However they must still abide by the laws of the state. Any unlawful behaviour that is carried out is punishable by the state. The question has shifted now, it is no longer ‘Should institutions be allowed to discriminate against Individuals?’ but ‘Can Institutions be allowed to discriminate against Individuals?’ The answer is an obvious No.

As Citizens of this country, as well as those non-citizens who live in this country, we must partake in certain obligations (i.e Paying taxes, voting during elections (citizens only, though Slavoj Zizek proposes a different view), acting in accordance with the laws of this country) in accordance with these obligations we get certain protections from the Government. We understand that our rights as Human Beings (Those of the Civil and Political rights) will be protected, That we have the freedom of speech, freedom of expression and other freedoms.

And yet Private institutions are still allowed to discriminate openly, without much recourse to their actions, against the very things that countries are supposed to project. What is this hypocrisy and why does it still exist in our world today?

In a recent addition to the story, the student has decided to leave the school 'if you can't live with "them", force "them" out' seems to apply aptly here. The school in making this decision has come off as the bad institution, rightly so, and the saddest thing perhaps is that the School turned against its own goals while it says to encompass ideas of truth, compassion and integrity as well as 'affirming tolerance and appreciation of other beliefs' It has shown its face as bigoted and stuck in a past, that should be forgotten.

Leiter on 'Continental Philosophy'

This is an old blog posting (2009) on Leiter's Neitzsche Blog about 'Continental Philosophy', While I agree with his expose of the 'Anonymous Blogger' that 'Continental philosophy' should not be wholly interweaved with the post-modernist philosophical agenda (of which I think he wrongly puts Derrida and Foucault into this category), but I cannot agree with him that the 'Continental Tradition' is not a 'tradition' at all. I think Leiter misunderstands the idea of tradition, and I think one can see from the "passing down" of methodological processes such as Dialectics (in Hegel and Marx), Kant's arguments from trancendentals and more contemporaneously, Deconstruction and Geneology, that such a tradition exists.

Thoughts and comments?

Methodological Individualism.

Hey Guys, This is part of a paper I presented at the Latrobe Philosophy Post-graduate seminar series, working on a few form for it and wondering if you could offer any assistance, criticisms, glaring holes which I may not have covered.

Given the caricature of analytical philosophy as those obsessed with the construction of an argument to the minute detail it seems to follow that one of the largest debates within this phenomenon of Marxist theory concerns methodological practise. Such a debate situates itself within the problems of methodological individualism and methodological collectivism[1], the former methodological process has in many ways become the unofficial flagship of Analytical Marxism, while the latter is said to be overused in the Continental tradition of Marxist theory. In this section we shall discuss the idea of methodological individualism and its relation to analytical Marxism. However before we discuss the relational value that methodological individualism holds with analytical Marxism we need to provide an account of what methodological individualism is, In order to do this I will turn to the writings of Torbjorn Tannsjo, John Roemer and Jon Elster, the last two being the leading proponents of methodological individualism for analytical Marxism[2]. Torbjorn Tannsjo in the article Methodological Individualism (1990) lays out a number of different definitions of the term methodological individualism. In the first instance, Tannsjo takes methodological individualism (MI) to explain social phenomena in individual terms, a point that both Elster and Roemer can agree upon. However in Tannsjo objective to find out whether (MI) is compatible with functionalism, structuralism and Marxism (Tannsjo, 1990) He focuses on what he calls the argument in defence of Methodological Individualism, or Epistemic Individualism[3] . There are two forms that Epistemic Individualism can take

1. Strong Epistemic Individualism (SEI) where social phenomena can ONLY be explained in individual terms.
2. Weak Epistemic Individualism (WEI) where social phenomena can BEST be explained in individual terms

It seems prima facie that an argument for Strong Epistemic Individualism cannot succeed in relations to criticisms. In order to understand what side of (MI) Elster and Roemer are situated on, it is apparent that we must discuss the comments that they have made in relation to this subject, on methodological Individualism.

In what has become Jon Elster’s most important contribution to the phenomena of analytical Marxism, Making Sense of Marx (1985) comes out of his commitment to the methodological processes on the social sciences, within its opening pages he sets out what he thinks is a correct analysis of Marxian concepts using such a process as methodological Individualism by which he means

“the doctrine that all social phenomena – their structure and their change – are in principle explicable in ways that only involve individuals – their properties, their goals, their beliefs and their actions” (Elster, p.5)

He holds that this sort of methodological tool can only be put into practice when in participation with extensional contexts – that a process like methodological individualism can only be applied to concepts whose meaning lies in its extension, Elster gives an example of this

“People often have beliefs about supra-individual entities that are not reducible to beliefs about individuals. “the Capitalists fear the working class” cannot be reduced to statements about the feelings of capitalists about individual workers, while “The capitalist profit is threatened by the working class” can be reduced to a complex statement about the consequences of actions taken by individual workers.” (Elster, p.6)

Such is Elster’s definition of methodological individualism[4] that it allows room for the irreducibility of social phenomena to the individual level that it fits with Tannsjo definition of a weak methodological individualist[5]. In turning to Roemer’s work on methodological individualism, we find a similar argument to that of Elster

“…in constructing arguments to explain social phenomena, it is necessary to explain the actions of individuals as resulting from their attempt to further their interests, as they see them – or, using economic terminology, aggregate behaviour must fundamentally be explained as the consequence of individual utility maximization.” (Roemer, p.352)

Roemer thinks that methodological individualism is a necessary reason for proper explanation of social phenomena; he does not think there is a sufficient reason for explanation of all social phenomena, which put him, with Elster, and perhaps other methodological individualists in the category of a weak methodological individualism.

One thing that happens to be problematic with methodological Individualism is Elster’s view that is

“Difficult to argue for it because it is difficult to understand how anyone could disagree wit it” (Elster, 295)

Putting aside his assumption that methodological individualism is true regardless of the many criticisms that have been expounded upon it, In Marxism and Individualism (1989) Elster puts forward three arguments for what he calls the desirability of scientific reductionism in general and for methodological individualism in particular. The arguments for desirability that Elster puts forward can be considered as follows (1) aesthetic reasons, (2) Confidence (3) necessity to understand the stability and change of aggregates. Elster argues that a situation may be ‘confidently’ explained through the use of macro-phenomena, but this cannot ‘satisfy’ our own curiosity about the phenomena. The rate of unemployment at t2 can be explained by the rate of inflation at t1, however according to Elster our curiosity forces us to look further into the matter by asking how inflation generates unemployment. Methodological Individualism seen in this way, as being aesthetically desirable, however seems to lead us to an almost infinite amount of questions pushed by our curiosity, leading us to an almost atomistic explanation of any social phenomena. Atomism marks one of the explanatory methods that is used within social scientific research, others being radical holism, methodological individualism and anti-reductionism[6]. Atomism is a methodological process that denies that relations- whether between individuals or between social entities – are ever genuinely explanatory (Wright et al., p. 109) while it may sound implausible, a counter to this may be that one cannot explain anything without reference to the social relations of the situation, the atomist may argue that the explanation is only explanatory because of the corresponding (non-relational) psychological states of these individuals. The problem with atomism is that it does not want to take into account that the way we think and believe things is heavily dependant on the social relationships we have with the world and in this way we cannot explain the way of social phenomena without some sort of reference to outside the ‘psychological states’ of the individual.

This may even lead to us to making the assumption that we can never fully explain any phenomena between individuals or between social entities, that is to say that an atomist would argue that everything that seems explanatory about the irreducible relations between individuals actually is explanatory only because of the corresponding (non-relational) psychological states of these individuals (Wright et al. 1987). The problem with the atomist position is its denial of the social situations that the individual is in to cause such psychological states to take place. As we have already seen how Elster does not want to commit himself to any explanation that reduces itself further then what may be explained by weak epistemic individualism, it seems that he cannot himself hold to this argument for the ‘desirability towards aesthetic reasons’. Elster may try to save himself from criticisms against his own argument from desirability by adding the clause that people might have to end up being satisfied with an explanation which doesn’t totally deliver on an explanation from Individualist action, that Methodological Individualism is an ideal whose value is that of pointing in a certain direction (Elster, 1985) However I do not see how this could be of any value, Elster speaks about curiosity and then inserts that we may have to be satisfied with certain results. This does not cure the curiosity of the situation, but merely puts a lid on it, I seek no other way of handling Elster’s argument by saying that it’s only way out is through atomism, which Elster does not want to commit himself to. Elster’s second argument for methodological individualism is that it improves our confidence in an alleged explanation, our beliefs that it does not rest on a spurious, non-explanatory explanation (Elster, 1989).

Elster’s second argument for methodological Individualism pertains to the boost to our confidence through an alleged explanation. Elster says that the temporal intervals between macro-phenomena are “empirically” longer then those that happen between micro-phenomena. Methodological Individualism allows for this temporal gap to be closed allowing for a more confident explanation

“By reducing the time span between explanans and explanandum, the risk of spurious explanation is also reduced. The latter risk arises in two main ways: by confusion of explanation and correlation and by the confusion of explanation and necessitation” (Elster, 196)

These risks occurs when (1) there is a third variable that generates both apparent cause and the apparent effect

(2) When the effect is brought about by some other cause that pre-empts the operation of the apparent cause.

In Elster’s ideal situation of using methodological individualism, both risks are reduced through approaching a continuous chain of cause and effect (Elster, 1989). This however seems to lead us into the same problem that we encountered in the first argument. The idea that confidence in one’s explanation should govern our ability to provide explanation just does not sit well within the confines of a methodological individualist schema, Just as the ‘aesthetic reason’ for using methodological individualism leads us to a atomist position, so to is our confidence in explanation. If by confidence, Elster means that the shorter the temporal intervals between phenomenal situations are more easily explained, then the most confidence in an explanation of social phenomena would be gained through the atomist position. The final argument that we shall examine of Elster’s in favour of methodological individualism is that a reduction of the social phenomena to individual actions is necessary to understand the stability and change of aggregates. Once again however, Elster fails to take into account that he cannot make these claims without fearing a reduction to an atomist account of explanation. While Jon Elster believes fundamentally that such a methodological process as methodological individualism is true, his arguments for why it is true fail to argue for methodological individualism itself, but argue instead for a reductionist explanation of social phenomena, the most radical of which is atomism; which all his arguments seem to be deducible to. if we look at the types of micro-foundations that they see as present within explanation of social phenomena, is not that a methodological individualism is wrong to conclude the many factors that it does conclude, but merely to say that given the multiple types of explanations that can be given through micro-foundation, it seems unreasonable to suggest that explanations should be removed if they do not conform to a methodological individualist model.

The idea that the social sciences should be concerned more with how the methodology that is being used makes sense in evidence of empirical data is found in Functionalism Vs. Rational Choice by Johannes Berger and Claus Offe, as a rejoinder to the debate between Cohen and Elster on the correct methodological process to use (in this case between Functional explanation and methodological Individualism) Berger and Offe argue firstly that methodological debates remain without a foundation if they are primarily being argued for strictly from methodology (Berger & Offe, 1982) but secondly it is important to understand why the argument is being made. The justification for the use of certain methodologies cannot be guaranteed upon theoretical analysis alone, but needs to be seen within the context of empirical data, however unfortunately we sometimes are not in a position to work with such empirical data and we must focus alone on theoretical analysis. In closing, while analytical Marxism identifies a useful path in the exploration of Marxian theory in explaining contemporary social phenomena, questions still need to be asked about its relation with the methodological process it uses in this exploration, specifically around questions about methodological individualism. In this paper I tried to point out that the assumptions made by Roemer and Elster about methodological Individualism fall short of their goal as a convincing argument made about the use of methodological individualism, and that such assumptions are a poor indication of its use. I think that the analytical Marxists are correct in identifying the substantive in Marx as what is fundamentally important, but this does not allow us to move away from critical engagement with methodological practices, and in many cases the question about methodology is the most crucial question to be asked.

---

[1] The debate within Analytical Marxism on methodological individualism can be thought of a continuation of the positivist debate that occurred in the 1950s between the Critical Rationalists and the Frankfurt School, What may be interesting to note is Elster’s admission that “most social scientists and social philosophers have come to accept the view as the truism it is” (Elster, 193) I do not share Elster’s enthusiasm for the truism of methodological individualism and view it as deeply flawed in many respects, some of which will be viewed in this paper.

[2] Elster and Roemer both find their rationale for providing a Marxian theory based on micro-foundations, that is one based on the analysis of the behaviour of individual actors, on a critique of the functionalism they say has perverted Marxian theory.

[3] While Torbjorn Tannsjo uses the phrasing Epistemic Individualism to describe the explanation of social phenomena to the level on the individual, I do not see how it differs from Methodological Individualism, as such I will continue to use methodological individualism unless referencing the material by Tannsjo. Elster uses the term interchangeable in his article Marxism and Individualism (1989)

[4] Elster also, in Marxism and Individualism (1989), wants to distinguish between political individualism and methodological individualism. Taking Schumpeter’s (1908) definition of political individualism that freedom contributes more than anything else to the development of man and to the general good is independent of methodological individualism “in the sense that all combinations of acceptance and rejection of the two are possible and coherent” (Elster, p201)

[5] Even without this quote from Elster’s Making Sense of Marx (1985) Elster can not be seen as a strong methodological individualist, if we turn once again to his article Marxism and Individualism he thinks that “an absurd and untenable version of MI is the view that social science could in principle eliminate all references to social wholes, collectivises, systems and the like. The objection to this view is well known and simple. When social aggregates are the object of individual beliefs and desires, one cannot always substitute, salva veritate, co-extensional individual referents” (Elster, 193)

[6] We have already to some extent explained what methodological individualism is, and later in the paper will be defining and reviewing what anti-reductionism is. Radical holism can be perhaps best explained as the anti-thesis to methodological individualism. Essentially, a radical holist will want to argue that individual relations are epiphenomenal in character that is they are a secondary characteristic of the explanation from a social level.

A Companion to Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand

Some of you may have already seen this, but for those that haven't, it's a pretty good reference that can be consulted online for free. The 'La Trobe' entry written by Brian Ellis is really good, and I think should be used by the department in future negotiations with the administration to stress the foundational role that philosophy has played at La Trobe and plays within the humanities at large. If the lecturers are treated better by giving them incentives to stay, then a lot of the big names wouldn't have left for higher profile departments, which really means departments that attract lecturers. According to the article, La Trobe used to be the biggest department in Australia, and there is no reason that we can't bring back some of that glory!

Epiphenomenalism

I was hoping that someone might be able to give me a hand with a problem I am having.

I am struggling with epiphenomenalism. The usual ‘definition’ is that epiphenomenalism says that consciousness, or mental events, is causally inert and all that does the ‘pushing and shoving’ are physical events (such as neural processes and other purely physical events). Consciousness just comes along for the ride.

We can break this down into type- and token-epiphenomenalism. Both kinds of epiphenomenalism hold that there are only physical causes and that there are no mental causes. However, type-epiphenomenalism holds that mental events might cause something, but only in virtue of some underlying physical cause, such as a particular neural process. Token epiphenomenalism, on the other hand, denies that mental events play ANY part in the causal chain.

Okay. What I need to know is in what sense mental events are said to be acausal for the epiphenomenalist. The problem is that there seem to be two ways mental events can have a causal impact. One way has it that they are INTERNAL to the workings of the mind, the other is that they are EXTERNAL to the workings of the mind. Here is an analogy: suppose I am driving a car and I swerve to avoid a tree. Here, the tree plays a causal role in the TOTAL causal story (if the tree were not there I would not have swerved), but in another sense it does not: it plays no part in explaining the processes that went on to make the car swerve. The latter causal story mentions ONLY the driver’s actions and the mechanics of the car. To draw the analogy, the tree plays only an external causal role to the workings of the structural system, viz. the driver and the car.

A similar story can be told with respect to mental events or consciousness. Suppose, for example, that I come to some conscious decision; say, that . There are two ways I can see conscious mental states playing a role here. The first one is that they are internal to the causal story. In this way I have a certain group of conscious mental states—such as , , and so on—which I internally process to come to the conclusion that . Here, these mental states play an internal causal role. But it seems possible that these conscious mental states play only an external causal role. Here, I would unconsciously come to the ‘conclusion’ that by unconsciously reflecting upon these conscious states. So these conscious mental states play a part in the TOTAL causal story, but they are like the tree: to explain the structural system, viz. the workings of the mind, one needs only to refer to the unconscious mental states.

Basically, I do not know whether the theory of epiphenomenalism denies that conscious mental states play ANY causal role (i.e. internal or external) or whether they deny that they play any INTERNAL causal role.

On the other hand, perhaps this makes little sense. Any help and/or suggestions would be great (stop writing on ‘We know what Penguins eat’ being a valid one!).

... and to follow up on important issues

And now a pertinent moral question

Gender and Philosophical Intuition

There has been talk amongst some of late about women being under-represented within academic philosophy. My intuition about this has been that women generally do not find philosophy (at least how it is done within academia) interesting enough to follow through. Some do, but most do not. Men, on the other hand, find it to be (in general terms) engaging. What's more, men are stoopid enough not to care too much about the lack of opportunities that (esp. at the postgraduate level) philosophy engenders.

Anyways, on this issue new research has been posted up on Leiter:

http://leiterreports.typepad.com/blog/2010/09/gender-and-philosophical-intuition.html

check out the paper, it is very interesting.

As I assumed, women generally do not have similar intuitions as men. But what is elucidating is the fact that this difference in intuitions is significantly different in respects to typical analytic philosophy thought experiments. A hypothesis that is discussed is that this discrepancy of intuition leaves many women thinking they are not good at philosophy and begin to drop off. Hence, why at later years the ratio of students favours men.

The question that I think arises here is whether philosophy itself is biased towards men. Does this need to change?

My own answer to this question is no. I think philosophy as it is done is useful. Yes, women are under-represented. This is not ideal, but we cannot force women to do philosophy. (We should however encourage them as much as is practically possible). If women are drawn to other academic disciplines then they can engage in the academic discourse there. (Maybe even engage philosophic discourse that is more 'intuition-friendly' to women). If the whole of academia is biased against women I would be highly critical, but if it not I find it quite okay for women to follow academic interests in areas other than philosophy.

I look forward to a discussion here.

Fallacies

You can find a nice .pdf of the fallacies here

Rules of Philosophizing

In The Principia, Newton developed rules of philosophizing. His fourth rule goes as follows:

"In experimental philosophy, propositions gathered from phenomena by induction should be considered either exactly or very nearly true notwithstanding any contrary hypotheses, until yet other phenomena make such propositions either more exact or liable to exceptions. … This rule should be followed so that arguments based on induction may not nullified by hypotheses.” (p. 796)

What this basically says is that empirically verified theories should not be undermined by a priori, logical possibilities. This effectively removes the bite from many of the skeptical thought experiments that have caused anxiety amongst so many as they worry about proving the independent existence of the external world. (As an aside, the problem of the evil demon has never elicited the necessary intuitions that would cause me to doubt the corrigibility of my senses. This is mainly because I don’t see it as metaphysically possible. Of course, our metaphysics could turn out to be wrong but this again is more of a logical or epistemic possibility. Therefore, epistemic possibility does not immediately undermine an empirically justified metaphysics. Sorry, David Chalmers.)

I think this is generally a good rule to follow especially in the fields of metaphysics and epistemology. It also got me thinking of if there are other rules of philosophizing that we could add to Newton’s. One that I strongly believe in is the prohibition of appealing to speculative hypotheses in math and physics to justify a dubious position. I have in mind countless appeals to either chaos theory in math and quantum mechanics (Copenhagen interpretation) in physics to back up claims of relativism, idealism, the impossibility of knowledge, etc. (I would also include appeals to Gödel’s theorem even though it is better established than the other hypotheses, but I think it is misused in the same way.) Why this is problematic is because not only do those appealing to these theories usually lack the depth of knowledge to effectively use them, but, moreover, they are questionable within their respective fields. Most use them as mysterious black boxes that are supposed to prove whatever absurd or ideologically driven theory they are supporting. Idealism? Quantum mechanics! Indeterminism? Chaos theory! No absolute truths? Gödel’s incompleteness theorem! Fail!

Can anyone think of others you’d like to include?

Who do I write like?

Just followed the link posted by Leiter that is a "statistical analysis tool, which analyzes your word choice and writing style and compares them with those of the famous writers."

Found here

Wanting to be reassured of my writing brilliance I added three different pieces of writing, all of which are philosophical, The results were that I write like Kurt Vonnegut, H.P. Lovecraft, and Daniel Dafoe.

I don't know if I am too happy about this. The first two are science-fiction writers and the pieces that were analysed were on moral philosophy. Dafoe, who is famous for Robinson Crusoe, is an early English novelist and wrote when the English language was in its infancy.

So the analysis of my writing is that, a) my thoughts about moral philosophy is just fantasy, and b) my English skills are infantile.

AAP Conference

I was just wondering if there were any thoughts on the AAP? I preferred last year's, in that I got to talk to more people and seemed to "learn" more. But this year's was much larger. Anyone have other comments?

John Haugeland 1945-2010

I was very sad to read at the Leiter reports that John Haugeland had passed away just a few days ago. He was definitely a philosopher I had hoped to meet at some stage but alas no more. I am encouraged that he spent some time at Uni. of Helsinki, though it was before I even knew Finland existed!

I can not recommend enough his collection of essays: Having Thought: Essays in the Metaphysics of Mind

If you are looking for a way to challenge the established understanding of how the mind works there is no better place to start.

-Nikolai

Ethical Scenarios

As I have just finished delivering a pair of lectures on professional ethics I have decided to post up some of the scenarios that I ended the lectures with. I gave these to the students to get them to engage with some moral reasoning. Have a look and tell me what you think. What is correct moral course of action, if any?

Also, tell me if you think they are weighted well, i.e. the answer is not so obvious.

Environment vs. Jobs

You are the CEO of a metal-processing plant. You have recently become aware of the massive negative environmental impact of your business and wish to make the factory cleaner and greener. There is also some consensus amongst the company’s shareholders that greener is better, so long as it does not hurt the bottom line. This consensus is by no means binding (i.e. it’s not imperative that this is done, merely something preferred if it was). Through new technology that can be bought through government subsidies that are calculated to be cost-effective in the long term, you realise that you can cut the factory’s pollution by 35%. However, this will come at a cost. As most of the new equipment is automatic you will only require 40% of the present workforce, meaning that if the company goes green they will have to sack 200 workers (the cost-benefit analysis economically justifying the change-over has taken into account that there will only be 40% of the current employees, to keep all employees will make the company lose money). At the cost of jobs for a cleaner environment should you do it? Why?

Same scenario, however, the move to the new equipment is not for environmental reasons, though there will some environmental benefit, but instead for financial reasons. What should you do? And why?

Bridge Building

You are a civil engineer working to build a much-needed bridge that is to replace a previous bridge that collapsed six months earlier due to a structure failure during an earthquake. A colleague of yours, Jim, also an engineer working on the same project has a confidential conversation with you about his belief that the type of cement your company is using is not strong enough and will likely lead to structural failure sometime in the future. You have no expertises in the area and cannot be sure of Jim’s claim, however, you know that is very sincere in his concern. Jim has asked you not to mention his concern, as he is worried about the repercussions. You nonetheless attempt to make the concern known without ever mentioning Jim’s name. You exhaust the correct channels within the company to highlight the concern about this type of concrete and at every point have been assured that it perfectly safe, however you are not sure whether to believe this or not.

What do you do? And Why? If you wish to take this concern any further you will need to mention Jim’s name and will need to make the concern known outside the company, thereby violating company policy, risking both your job and Jim’s. If nothing is done, and Jim is right, structure failure of the bridge could kill a number of people, or at the very least, cost a lot of taxpayer’s money.

Nuclear Scientist

(an old one that I came across in undergraduate but cannot remember where, if you let me know. I’ve also expanded on what I remember this scenario to be)

You are a Nuclear Physicist and have been offered a job at Nuclear weapons company. This new job offers twice the pay that you are presently receiving at your current job as an underpaid scientist, which doesn’t let you utilise your skills and expertises within nuclear physics, and you know that you and your family will have a much better lifestyle should you take this opportunity. Also you know that the job market is very bad at the moment and that it is likely that you will not be able to get a better job than this one for a long time. The problem is that you know that this company has a particularly bad track record with selling their nuclear arms to ‘failed states’ and that this particular contract you will be employed under is to sell the produced arms to a rather volatile nation already at war with a neighbouring country. You know if you do not take up this job that somebody else will (i.e. the arms will be produced either way). Do you take the job? Why? Is this decision more to do with your own personal well-being than any other concern? (There is no legal precedent to close the operations of this company)

A Fortuitous Meeting Between Kant and Hume

Something I wrote as an undergraduate for the hell of it. Some of you may appreciate it.



Immanuel Kant sits alone at a wooden table in a tavern at noon as he does everyday for lunch. The server has just brought him his meal with each item of food carefully separated from one another on the plate. He places his napkin on his lap and picks up his knife and fork. David Hume quietly sneaks up behind Kant with a large pint of beer in his hand. He grabs Kant’s shoulder with his free hand.

HUME: BAH!

Kant drops his fork and knife.

KANT: Why must you keep pestering me? I have a very strict schedule to maintain and I cannot keep making exceptions for your tomfoolery.

Hume sits down beside Kant in an empty chair at his table. He takes a big swig of beer.

HUME: Oh come on, Manny. You need to lighten up! Stop living your life as if the next moment were absolutely necessary!

KANT: That is easy for you to say; you do not even think we are able to have any kind of knowledge involving cause! The future, essentially, is without necessary determination.

HUME: Blah, blah, blah. You and cause. Why can’t you just let it go?

KANT: You’re the one who brought it up. I was happy in my ignorance when it came to the notion of necessary connection, but you were the one made me question its assumption.

HUME: Of course. It’s all my fault. But since you mentioned it, tell me again that nice little story that you call your proof for the notion of cause being prior to experience.

KANT: First, let me ask you a question. Are we not in possession of truths of pure mathematics and pure natural science?

HUME: I will concede that we believe we have knowledge, but I would question the assertion that we have certain knowledge.

KANT: But are not the propositions of geometry both certain and universal? Is not the physical system of Newton a beacon of truth for the natural sciences?

HUME: What about non-Euclidian geometry and Einsteinian physics?

KANT: What? What are you talking about?

HUME: Huh? What just happened? I kind of just blacked out.

KANT: Nevermind that, you were only speaking nonsense. As I was saying, we are in possession of truths that are universal and necessary. Now, how could that be if all our ideas have their basis in experience?

HUME: How else could we come about them? All we have are sense impressions and from those we abstract ideas, one of them being the notion of causation. It is only through the constant conjunction of one event after another that we may say that events similar to the first event cause events similar to the consequence.

KANT: But that would undermine all our science! Furthermore, if our minds were completely blank upon birth and we had no kind of mental framework to order the sense impressions, as you call them, then we would never be able to say we were experiencing the world. Therefore, we must have certain a priori conditions that make possible experience. If everything we claim to know was the result of mere sense impressions without any kind of a priori forms, then all we would experience is a chaotic play of sensations.

HUME: How do you propose to solve this dilemma?

KANT: Well, if our concepts taken from empirical cognition lack the necessity required of them then they must be a priori. Eine Minuten, bitte.

Kant reaches into his pocket and takes out a piece of paper that he unfolds to display two tables.

KANT: At the top, you can see a table of judgment, which is comprised of the basic judgments we employ in our logical systems. These judgments employ concepts that are of a necessary nature and are therefore a priori. This second table lists the pure categories of the understanding, which enable us to make the above judgments.

HUME: You make such nice charts, Manny.

KANT: Don’t patronize me! I put a lot of time, about ten years, in coming up with these charts! At least give me a chance.

HUME: I’m sorry. Please continue.

KANT: Thank you. Okay, I have metaphysically deduced the pure concepts by showing that they are a priori, but now I must show that they are necessary for experience. This is what I call my Transcendental Deduction and fleshes out the Copernican Revolution that is Transcendental Philosophy.

HUME: That’s a pretty pretentious to name one’s system, isn’t it?

KANT: It would be if the results did not justify such an appellation, but in this case, I believe it is warranted. Now, as I was saying, my Copernican Revolution answers the question, “How do subject conditions of thought (the categories) have objective validity?” You are quite right to say that the content of experience is given to us only through sensibility but this is not enough to achieve experience. Concepts without intuitions are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind.

HUME: Speaking of blind, there’s your sightless friend over there. Hey, Didi…

KANT: Don’t draw his attention over here! You know how I feel about the blind.

HUME: Are you sure? He’s a pretty cool guy once you…

KANT: Please! I just want to finish explaining my system and then eat my lunch in peace.

HUME: Okay, Okay.

KANT: So, intuitions need concepts so that the content may ordered and present itself to consciousness as experience. Objects are given to us through sensibility and therefore must be subsumed under the pure concepts. Thus, in order for objects as such to be determined as objects, the manifold of intuition must be combined according to necessary rules, which are the categories. Our subjective conditions of thought have objective validity because it is only through our pure concepts that objects are given to us as such in experience. Objects conform to our forms of thought and not the other way around.

HUME: But then aren’t you left with a total idealism where everything exists only in the mind? We could go around making extraordinary metaphysical claims without any kind of checks and balances on our speculations.

KANT: You would be right if it were not for two things. First, as I said earlier, concepts without intuitions are blind. We require sensations for the matter of our cognitions, but matter, in turn, requires the concepts, as functions of unity, as forms of cognition. Knowledge is only possible with the workings of both the faculties of sensibility and understanding in concerto. Second, we are only dealing with appearances and not things as they are in themselves. Our cognitions are supplied by an external source, but we can only know it as it appears to us. This puts a limit on what we can claim to know. So, yes, I am an idealist, but only insofar as I am considered a formal idealist, or a transcendental idealist.

HUME: So you’re a skeptic just like me? If only I would have known then I wouldn’t have given you such a hard time at the Princess’ party the other night.

KANT: Please don’t remind me of that awful experience. I’m still trying to convince everyone that the donkey and I are just friends.

HUME: AHAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA! You should have seen your face when you woke up. Classic.

KANT: Well, at least I ended up with a top teaching post at an accredited university.

HUME: That’s cold…So cold…

KANT: Look, if you would actually read my Critique of Pure Reason you would see that our projects are not so different. I too believe that reason should be limited in order to make room for faith and that it is extremely important that we make absolutely clear what exactly our terms mean in our system. Ideas like God, the soul, and freedom are concepts that cannot be applied to any object of a possible experience. We cannot then say they constitute reality as we can with the concepts of the understanding. However, we may use them in a regulative fashion and help direct our experience. We may say they are pragmatic suppositions of pure reason.

HUME: That sounds a lot like my mitigated skepticism. I would agree with you that it’s not pragmatic to become a full skeptic like Pyrrho. Society would fall apart and we would be left with utter anarchy. I also believe that we cannot know everything in the world fully, or as you would say, know things as they are in themselves. I think we have similar projects!

KANT: I would agree, but I would stretch our knowledge further than your more minimal skeptical program. For instance, the notion of causation is included in my table of pure concepts. When applied to intuition we may say, without hesitation, that we know that event A caused the proceeding event B.

HUME: On that notion, I will never yield to your subtle reasoning. It is only my belief that event B will follow event A that gives me my concept of necessary connection. Induction, in terms of a certain result, is a lost cause.

KANT: Now who needs to be awoken from their dogmatic slumber?

HUME: On the contrary! I believe I am being much more thoroughly pragmatic and not dogmatic. We can still operate on the assumption that A causes B, but on no occasion can I say I know it for certain. I’m just trying to be a thorough going fallibalist.

KANT: I guess on this point we must agree to disagree. Now I have tried to give the best summation of my position as possible. What I really want to do now is enjoy my now cold meal.

HUME: Alright! Alright! I’ll leave you to your Bratwurst.

KANT: Thank you and good day.

Hume gets up and walks off behind Kant. He quietly turns around and sneaks backup behind Kant.

HUME: BOO!

Kant drops his wine glass in his lap, staining the white linen napkin.

KANT: HUME!

Kant shakes his pale white fists in the air and shoots an evil glare at Hume who is laughing so hard he falls to the floor. Kant turns back around, rings out his napkin, and starts to eat his lunch.

Religion and the Objectivity of Moral Principles

One of the most often repeated criticisms of atheism is that it cannot account for morality. Of course, what this argument is really against is a naturalistic reductionism in which moral properties supervene the physical characteristics of things. What is ultimately real are physical facts and if there were no sentient creatures who have moral thoughts, then so goes morality while the laws of physics remain. Someone who is a realist about moral properties and who gives up on reductive materialism can still claim to be an atheist. It does not follow from the fact that matter in not all there is to the fact that there is a God or even some kind of immortal soul. Of course, the same arguments one finds convincing against the existence of God should also work against the positing of some immaterial stuff above and beyond what constitutes the physical world. So while it is not contradictory to believe in both, there may be reasons why holding the two views simultaneously lacks sufficient justification.

Grounding moral laws in God is supposed to overcome this problem for the naturalistic outlook. Since God is eternal and moral truths are grounded in God, then the death of all life does not entail the annihilation of moral properties. The objectivity of morality is thus ensured by the existence of God. The standard response to this view is from Plato's Euthyphro where the questions is asked: if it is true that 'p is good iff God commands p', then God either commands p because p is good or because God likes God. If the first disjunct is correct, then the analysis of what it is to be good has not explained what it is to be good, and, moreover, God is superfluous since it no longer grounds the good. If the second disjunct is true, then what is good is dependent on the whim of God. Torturing children and genocide would be good if God so commands (examples from the Old Testament). Those who subscribe to the belief that God is the source of what is moral must bite the bullet and admit that anything is permitted insofar as it is decreed by God.

I don't want to get into a debate about moral intuitions and whether this view really seems to be any more moral than a naturalistically conceived one. I want to ask whether the Divine Command Theory achieves objectivity or not. Since God is all powerful (this is an assumption but one that is often made) it could annul its own existence at any time. If morality is grounded in God, then when God vanishes so do moral laws. However, if natural laws, even if they were created by God, are not grounded in God’s continued existence (though this would be denied by some theologians), then the disappearance of God would not affect their functioning. God is a dictator whose disappearance would create a moral void as the death of the leader of a totalitarian state – without a formal constitution - would result in a similar power vacuum. This counterfactual difference suggests that moral laws impose themselves less stringently than do natural laws, and if this is the case, then moral laws do not have the same objective legitimacy as natural laws. Moreover, given that moral laws are regulative, one could rebel against God and decide to live a life according to another set of principles or none at all. But one is not able to live a life according to alternate laws of physics. Gravity is the same for all participants on Earth; natural laws are constitutive of existence.

At most, God serves as the last arbiter of justice, the one who balances the scales when mortal law fails to right a wrong. There is something appealing about this account but wishing something to be the case doesn’t make it so. Essentially, God is the most powerful law enforcement officer but one who seems to wait until death to pass down judgement. But how is this really different than imposing order on a population through coercive means? (By coercive I don not merely mean physically violence or intimidation but includes what some like to call structural violence and acculturation.) Divine laws are ontologically on the same level as human law as contingent prohibitions and allowances of behavior. What supposedly separates the laws of God from mortal law is their legitimacy, but if they are no more than the imposition of the will of God, then it would seem that what legitimates them is the threat of divine force, which is, hypothetically, many times more powerful than anything that can be imagined on Earth. On the other hand, terrestrial justice is much more reliable in the sense that it is within our power to enact it; one does not have to rely on a divine promise, if there is one at all, for a punishment to come.

Perhaps the Divine Command Theorist can counter that it is God's privileged position of having all true knowledge that would count as justification for its laws over those of man. Humans, despite having tasted the fruit of knowledge, are still in ignorance; we cannot reach a 'God's eye point of view'. God's laws, then, have the advantage of being formulated in accordance with all of the relevant information, which surely means we should trust its judgement over ours. But if moral laws and values are not something of this world that is there to be discovered and are rather just the whims of a deity, albeit an omniscient one, then there is no reason to trust God's judgement over our own. One should follow God's rules so that its plan is realized, but this plan is just as much a result of an arbitrary choice as anything humans can think up. In essence, there is nothing to know that would justify the moral laws of God in light of its overall plan so being omniscient is not an advantage. We're back to “we should follow God because it has the power to punish us for all eternity.”

The moral secularist and the divine command theorist find themselves in the same position in trying to justify the initial premiss of a fundamental project from which one can derive the moral laws that will help realize this end (think increase freedom or happiness as fundamental projects). Moreover, the moral secularist is in the beneficial position of not relying on a highly questionable theistic metaphysics. For the divine command theory to work one must justify the belief in a God, justify the ability to know what God decrees, and justify that we do in fact have such knowledge. It is one thing proving that it is reasonable to believe in the existence of God; it is a whole other thing to show that any of the competing world religions speak the truth of God. Even if the best explanation of our universe is a deity, there is the further burden of proving we have epistemic access to the dictates of God. Maybe humans just aren't made so that God can reveal itself to us. If that can be argued convincingly, then the theists must provide sufficient evidence that we in fact have such knowledge. I have the capacity to see a UFO as do others, but all the purported sightings in the world could all be hoaxes. Personal revelation is probably the most unreliable means of acquiring knowledge. Not only do we suffer from numerous cognitive biases that go mostly unacknowledged, the extent to which individual revelations differ between those of opposing faiths and those within a faith provides sufficient evidence that not only must most revelations be wrong, but we also should be actively suspicious of their claims. These formidable obstacles must be faced by the divine command theorist before his view can even begin at the starting point of the moral secularist.

To sum up, if there are naturally occurring moral properties akin to the usual physical properties, then morality does not depend on God much like natural laws. Therefore, God is not needed for morality. If there aren't moral properties, then both secular morality and theistic morality are based on contingent premises that must be chosen either by the individual or some group of individuals in the former case or by God in the latter. Thus, there is no objectivity gap between mortal morality and divine morality. However, the divine command theorist has the additional burden of proving the existence of God and knowing what it demands before it can be a candidate for a satisfying alternative to secular morality. (Even if none of it can be proven, it still remains an alternative moral system, though one that must rely on more faith based assumptions. Hence, why it is unsatisfying.) Therefore, one of the most common challenges to atheism/naturalism is just as much a problem for moral theists and, perhaps, more so because of the extra weight of the onuses their view faces.

New Heidegger Film

Check out the trailer to a new Heidegger film here. Looks much more entertaining than The Ister, though who doesn't want to watch a boat go slowly down a river while listening to Bernard Stiegler talk about technology.

Postgrad Don'ts

As we have a new bunch of postgrads starting I figured that I should share some invaluable knowledge from the mighty Spiros and his followers:

http://philosophersanon.blogspot.com/2010/03/incoming-student-visit-donts.html

I think that all of us have done at least one of the don'ts on the extensive list!

Enjoy

Heidegger on the web

Thanks for a great reading group yesterday, nice turn out and excellent discussions.

Here are some useful links for Heidegger that I have been using:

A list of his publications/lectures:

http://think.hyperjeff.net/Heidegger

A lot of Heidegger stuff here:

http://www.beyng.com/

In particular a useful but not complete list of Greek words used in Being and Time:

http://www.beyng.com/grk/hgrkwrds.html

Enjoy!

-Nikolai

Journal rankings

If anyone is like me and thinking to publish but wanting to know what the "good" philosophy journals are, I just discovered that the ARC and ERA has its own ranking of pretty much every journal ever. These have then be nicely organised for philosophy by the AAP.

You can find the excel sheet here. It is the file labeled: Rankings workbook

-Nikolai

Reading the impossible?

Today is the first session of the Heidegger Reading Group. To start off nice and gentle into the world of Heidegger we will be watching an interview with Hubert Dreyfus:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aaGk6S1qhz0

An oldie but a goodie. If you can't make it to today's session (8th of March) then you can easily catch up online.

Is your philosophical theory bad-ass?

Here's an interesting link that rates philosophical views on whether or not they are bad-ass or wussy. She uses it to endorse her own dietary restrictions against eating cute things, called acutetarian.

Can anyone think of other bad-ass or wussy views? Personally, I would put metaphysical idealism as a somewhat wussy view because often what motivates it are epistemic worries, e.g., a metaphysical reading of Kant's transcendental idealism. Though I guess I have to concede that when idealist bite the bullet and admit that their view can lead to solipsism then that makes them somewhat bad-ass, but it's a forced bad-assness.

Welcome the LTU philosophy blog

Greetings and welcome to the blog and discussion space for the postgraduate students studying philosophy of La Trobe University in Melbourne.

Updates will include papers from the fortnightly postgrad colloquium, ongoing discussions taking place among members and drunken rants after long nights in the pub.

Topics are wide and varying but our university does have one project focussing on the divide between analytic and continental philosophy.

So welcome and please enjoy our philosophical ramblings.

-Nikolai