2012!

To kick off 2012 and in an effort to revitalise this blog I have made my whole talk for the next Postgrad colloquium available. Just click HERE. Take a look and come along this Wednesday, 7th of March to HU2 431, 4-6pm.

I hope we can see some of the discussion raised in the colloquium carry onto this blog.

Also, for those interested, you can find my own personal philosophy blog at:
http://alderstump.blogspot.com.au/

See you Wednesday,

Nikolai

APPC 2011: 29 April - 1 May

This post is to ensure that everyone is aware of the 2011 APPC that is coming up shortly (just after easter), to be held at Monash, Caulfield. There are quite a number of La Trobeans presenting, so it should be good. It runs from Friday 29 April to Sunday 1 May. Click here for the homepage of this event. The conference schedule should be coming out shortly.

News and Events

Hey everyone, I hope your summers have been pleasant and continue to do so for the time that remains. I just want to post a few news items that might be of some interest.

First, the RAE results were released not too long ago and while La Trobe overall had mixed results (we were ranked 18th out of 41 by the Australian, 3rd in Victoria), our department did well. We, along with 6 other departments, were given a ranking of 4 out of 5, which means above world standard. Only Sydney and ANU were awarded the rank of 5. This is a great result, and we should use this to our advantage from funding requests to party smalltalk.

Second, Monash will be hosting this year's Australasian Postgraduate Philosophy Conference on April 29-May 1. As we won't suffer from any financial burden for airfare (as far as I can tell, the conference is free with catered lunches), I think we should try to have a strong showing to represent our department. The deadline to submit an abstract is March 15th and the conference is not for another 2 months so there is plenty of time to either work out something new or polish up an existing piece. It'll be a good opportunity to try out your ideas on new ears and maybe meet others with similar interests.

Third, I will be running this year's postgrad reading group with the first semester topic of meta-ethics (second semester to be determined). I chose this topic not only because of my own interest in the topic but also because we have quite a few students who are working on topics within the normative sphere of philosophy. In particular, we will be dealing with the question of the objectivity of moral properties and the realism/anti-realism debate. Hopefully, this may also be of interest for those who are of a more theoretical bent. Meetings are tentatively scheduled for Friday so that some who are interested in the topic can attend though this may change as our semester schedules are finalized. The first reading will be handed out at the first postgrad colloquium. If you have a specific article that you'd like to be discussed just let me know.

Nietzsche and the analytics

When one thinks about what Nietzsche has to say about ethics—that is, when one spends the time to really think about what he is saying—one can’t help but think that ethicists have something to answer for. For if Nietzsche is correct in what he says, then the ethics we currently practice is in all sorts of trouble, not to mention the analytic philosophers who talk about ethics. Their (the analytic philosophers) general assumption that this phenomena we call ‘ethics’ is in some way legitimate, or ‘good practice’, or ‘beneficial toward life’, or whatever, seems in all sorts of trouble. But there doesn’t seem to be a direct answer to Nietzsche.

Is this a problem? Foot (1978), for example, thinks not: she says that we can dismiss Nietzsche (or at least most of Nietzsche) due to the dependency his project has on his doctrine of ‘will to power’. She thinks that any wholesale description of human motivation is bound to fail, and she casts doubt on someone like Nietzsche (the solitary genius) having any great insights into the motivations of the general population. I have doubts over Foot’s ‘get out of jail free’ card she is playing here. I think her real problem is captured in the following quote: ‘a confrontation with Nietzsche is a difficult thing to arrange [because] [w]e find it hard to know where we could meet him because of the intrinsically puzzling nature of a project such as his’ (Foot 1978, p. 82).

What I am exploring—and I would love some feedback on this—is what sort of confrontation there might be between analytic philosophers and Nietzsche. In particular, I am thinking of the confrontation between Nietzsche and Leiter’s (1997, p. 285) Anglo-American philosophers (in the quote below):

It would be neither surprising nor unreasonable for Anglo- American philosophers to express doubts about their competence to undertake or assess such a critical project: such a "philosophical" undertaking—if that is what it deserves to be called—brings to mind a very different conception of philosophy, in which reflection is manifestly not a priori and analysis is not merely "conceptual" or, in this post-Quinean world, simply the a posteriori handmaiden of the natural and social sciences. In its Nietzschean incarnation, philosophy quickly crosses the line into psychology, cultural anthropology, and social critique—territory now occupied (regrettably) almost exclusively by literary theorists.

So I am thinking of the analytic philosopher as one who is mainly concerned with conceptual analysis. And I see that there might be a confrontation between Nietzsche and the analytics in this regard. For if Nietzsche has done anything it is to (re-)identify some (or perhaps most) of our value-concepts. So, say I, it is by concentrating on this aspect of Nietzsche that a direct confrontation between him and the analytics can be forged.

I have more to say on this, but I would love feedback, so I shall keep it short for the consumer! So consider what I say in the next two paragraphs as an example of Nietzsche’s ‘conceptual analysis’:

Nietzsche has a lot to say about pity (mittleid), especially in Daybreak (see sects. 131-139). His primary target is Christianity (132), and its influence on European thinking. He mentions Schopenhauer in this regard, saying that Schopenhauer thought pity was ‘the source of each and every moral action’ (133). The idea being that pity impels one to help another, for one is, at that moment, not thinking of oneself (133). But this is a mistake, Nietzsche thinks, for ‘pity’ is a ‘polyphonous… being’ (133). For Nietzsche, there are two stages in pity. In the first stage, when one sees another suffering (leid) one is not ‘thoughtlessly moved’ to assist them, but one is thinking of oneself ‘very strongly unconsciously’. This is due to our innate desire to imitate things (142). But then one enjoins the sufferer to some degree, so that the pitier, too, is suffering (cf. 134). This suffering is different from, but isomorphic to, the one who is pitied. But as one is unconsciously moved to promote one’s own well-being (cf. 108), one attempts to relieve one’s own, peculiar, suffering in some way. This is the second stage of pity, where the pitier attempts to relieve their suffering by exacting some sort of malevolent revenge on the one who is pitied (133, for a slightly different perspective, see 138). Both these stages of pity can be cashed out in many different ways (see 133 for details), such is the polyphonous nature of the value-concept: pity.

Something approaching conceptual analysis of other value-concepts is scattered throughout the Nietzschean corpus, such as love (e.g. GS 14, 345, BGE 268, Z, The second dance song), courage (D, 277, 419, 551), selfless action (e.g. D, 148, GS 21, 338, BGE 260), friendship (GS 14, BGE 27, 260), to mention a few. What complicates matters is the manner in which these critiques occur, for often a certain value-concept is critiqued as a sub-argument in a larger argument. This causes a logistical problem, rather than a logical one. But this does not destabilise the point that I have been making: there is something that verges on conceptual analysis in Nietzsche in which the analytics can (and must) engage him. I have only mentioned one such value-concept, viz. pity, and have not considered what follow-on effects such a ‘conceptual re-definition’ may have. Nietzsche certainly points to these follow-on effects, and it is these follow on effects that pose not only a cultural, but a theoretical, critique, contra Leiter.

Maybe I haven’t said enough to motivate the point, or maybe you think I have said enough but there just isn’t a point to be made. Either way, I would love some comments on this.

Have a great Christmas!

Individual rights above private institutions.

The recent events involving a ‘Private’ high School student being prevented from attending her formal because she wanted to attend this special event with her girlfriend (see story here) has sparked worldwide media coverage (here, and Here). But the question that these media stories have been avoiding is the question of whether privatized Institutions should be allowed to continue to discriminate in this way. This is the question I now pose.

The School in question, Ivanhoe Girls School, acknowledges on their site that they aim to provide “the best learning and teaching which, underpinned by the Christian philosophy, enables every girl to achieve her potential and to be a confident, optimistic and responsible citizen.” In this case, ‘Christian philosophy’ marks an important point of procedure.

It is well established, within Literature and media, that Christianity (as well as other religions based around the mono-theistic rhetoric of Judeo-Christian beliefs) are profoundly homophobic in their teachings. However given that the student had been quite open about her sexual orientation, why given the schools stance was she accepted into the institution in the first place and yet not allowed to attend an event at the school? Several reasons why the student was not permitted to attend were given by the Headmistress of the School (They are mentioned in the news articles above, I will not repeat them here) hide a prejudice which is obvious to everyone it seems but the Headmistress herself.

This brings us to the question, Should private institutions be allowed to discriminate against individuals? The ‘Victorian Equal Opportunity Act 1995’ (See Here) tells us that it is unlawful to discriminate against people because of their sexual orientation, this is in relation to areas such as ‘Employment; partnerships; firms; professional and other organisations; qualifying bodies; employment agencies; education; provision of goods and services; accommodation (including alteration of accommodation); clubs or community service organisations; municipal or shire councils.’ Now we could argue about the merits of a high school formal being part of the students education, it is my opinion that social events within the school are an important educational tool for the development of students.

The private sector in Business, education and such is so called because they get their financial support (though its hard to tell these days) from private investors. Such investments allow them to work ‘free’ from government intervention, However they must still abide by the laws of the state. Any unlawful behaviour that is carried out is punishable by the state. The question has shifted now, it is no longer ‘Should institutions be allowed to discriminate against Individuals?’ but ‘Can Institutions be allowed to discriminate against Individuals?’ The answer is an obvious No.

As Citizens of this country, as well as those non-citizens who live in this country, we must partake in certain obligations (i.e Paying taxes, voting during elections (citizens only, though Slavoj Zizek proposes a different view), acting in accordance with the laws of this country) in accordance with these obligations we get certain protections from the Government. We understand that our rights as Human Beings (Those of the Civil and Political rights) will be protected, That we have the freedom of speech, freedom of expression and other freedoms.

And yet Private institutions are still allowed to discriminate openly, without much recourse to their actions, against the very things that countries are supposed to project. What is this hypocrisy and why does it still exist in our world today?

In a recent addition to the story, the student has decided to leave the school 'if you can't live with "them", force "them" out' seems to apply aptly here. The school in making this decision has come off as the bad institution, rightly so, and the saddest thing perhaps is that the School turned against its own goals while it says to encompass ideas of truth, compassion and integrity as well as 'affirming tolerance and appreciation of other beliefs' It has shown its face as bigoted and stuck in a past, that should be forgotten.

Leiter on 'Continental Philosophy'

This is an old blog posting (2009) on Leiter's Neitzsche Blog about 'Continental Philosophy', While I agree with his expose of the 'Anonymous Blogger' that 'Continental philosophy' should not be wholly interweaved with the post-modernist philosophical agenda (of which I think he wrongly puts Derrida and Foucault into this category), but I cannot agree with him that the 'Continental Tradition' is not a 'tradition' at all. I think Leiter misunderstands the idea of tradition, and I think one can see from the "passing down" of methodological processes such as Dialectics (in Hegel and Marx), Kant's arguments from trancendentals and more contemporaneously, Deconstruction and Geneology, that such a tradition exists.

Thoughts and comments?

Methodological Individualism.

Hey Guys, This is part of a paper I presented at the Latrobe Philosophy Post-graduate seminar series, working on a few form for it and wondering if you could offer any assistance, criticisms, glaring holes which I may not have covered.

Given the caricature of analytical philosophy as those obsessed with the construction of an argument to the minute detail it seems to follow that one of the largest debates within this phenomenon of Marxist theory concerns methodological practise. Such a debate situates itself within the problems of methodological individualism and methodological collectivism[1], the former methodological process has in many ways become the unofficial flagship of Analytical Marxism, while the latter is said to be overused in the Continental tradition of Marxist theory. In this section we shall discuss the idea of methodological individualism and its relation to analytical Marxism. However before we discuss the relational value that methodological individualism holds with analytical Marxism we need to provide an account of what methodological individualism is, In order to do this I will turn to the writings of Torbjorn Tannsjo, John Roemer and Jon Elster, the last two being the leading proponents of methodological individualism for analytical Marxism[2]. Torbjorn Tannsjo in the article Methodological Individualism (1990) lays out a number of different definitions of the term methodological individualism. In the first instance, Tannsjo takes methodological individualism (MI) to explain social phenomena in individual terms, a point that both Elster and Roemer can agree upon. However in Tannsjo objective to find out whether (MI) is compatible with functionalism, structuralism and Marxism (Tannsjo, 1990) He focuses on what he calls the argument in defence of Methodological Individualism, or Epistemic Individualism[3] . There are two forms that Epistemic Individualism can take

1. Strong Epistemic Individualism (SEI) where social phenomena can ONLY be explained in individual terms.
2. Weak Epistemic Individualism (WEI) where social phenomena can BEST be explained in individual terms

It seems prima facie that an argument for Strong Epistemic Individualism cannot succeed in relations to criticisms. In order to understand what side of (MI) Elster and Roemer are situated on, it is apparent that we must discuss the comments that they have made in relation to this subject, on methodological Individualism.

In what has become Jon Elster’s most important contribution to the phenomena of analytical Marxism, Making Sense of Marx (1985) comes out of his commitment to the methodological processes on the social sciences, within its opening pages he sets out what he thinks is a correct analysis of Marxian concepts using such a process as methodological Individualism by which he means

“the doctrine that all social phenomena – their structure and their change – are in principle explicable in ways that only involve individuals – their properties, their goals, their beliefs and their actions” (Elster, p.5)

He holds that this sort of methodological tool can only be put into practice when in participation with extensional contexts – that a process like methodological individualism can only be applied to concepts whose meaning lies in its extension, Elster gives an example of this

“People often have beliefs about supra-individual entities that are not reducible to beliefs about individuals. “the Capitalists fear the working class” cannot be reduced to statements about the feelings of capitalists about individual workers, while “The capitalist profit is threatened by the working class” can be reduced to a complex statement about the consequences of actions taken by individual workers.” (Elster, p.6)

Such is Elster’s definition of methodological individualism[4] that it allows room for the irreducibility of social phenomena to the individual level that it fits with Tannsjo definition of a weak methodological individualist[5]. In turning to Roemer’s work on methodological individualism, we find a similar argument to that of Elster

“…in constructing arguments to explain social phenomena, it is necessary to explain the actions of individuals as resulting from their attempt to further their interests, as they see them – or, using economic terminology, aggregate behaviour must fundamentally be explained as the consequence of individual utility maximization.” (Roemer, p.352)

Roemer thinks that methodological individualism is a necessary reason for proper explanation of social phenomena; he does not think there is a sufficient reason for explanation of all social phenomena, which put him, with Elster, and perhaps other methodological individualists in the category of a weak methodological individualism.

One thing that happens to be problematic with methodological Individualism is Elster’s view that is

“Difficult to argue for it because it is difficult to understand how anyone could disagree wit it” (Elster, 295)

Putting aside his assumption that methodological individualism is true regardless of the many criticisms that have been expounded upon it, In Marxism and Individualism (1989) Elster puts forward three arguments for what he calls the desirability of scientific reductionism in general and for methodological individualism in particular. The arguments for desirability that Elster puts forward can be considered as follows (1) aesthetic reasons, (2) Confidence (3) necessity to understand the stability and change of aggregates. Elster argues that a situation may be ‘confidently’ explained through the use of macro-phenomena, but this cannot ‘satisfy’ our own curiosity about the phenomena. The rate of unemployment at t2 can be explained by the rate of inflation at t1, however according to Elster our curiosity forces us to look further into the matter by asking how inflation generates unemployment. Methodological Individualism seen in this way, as being aesthetically desirable, however seems to lead us to an almost infinite amount of questions pushed by our curiosity, leading us to an almost atomistic explanation of any social phenomena. Atomism marks one of the explanatory methods that is used within social scientific research, others being radical holism, methodological individualism and anti-reductionism[6]. Atomism is a methodological process that denies that relations- whether between individuals or between social entities – are ever genuinely explanatory (Wright et al., p. 109) while it may sound implausible, a counter to this may be that one cannot explain anything without reference to the social relations of the situation, the atomist may argue that the explanation is only explanatory because of the corresponding (non-relational) psychological states of these individuals. The problem with atomism is that it does not want to take into account that the way we think and believe things is heavily dependant on the social relationships we have with the world and in this way we cannot explain the way of social phenomena without some sort of reference to outside the ‘psychological states’ of the individual.

This may even lead to us to making the assumption that we can never fully explain any phenomena between individuals or between social entities, that is to say that an atomist would argue that everything that seems explanatory about the irreducible relations between individuals actually is explanatory only because of the corresponding (non-relational) psychological states of these individuals (Wright et al. 1987). The problem with the atomist position is its denial of the social situations that the individual is in to cause such psychological states to take place. As we have already seen how Elster does not want to commit himself to any explanation that reduces itself further then what may be explained by weak epistemic individualism, it seems that he cannot himself hold to this argument for the ‘desirability towards aesthetic reasons’. Elster may try to save himself from criticisms against his own argument from desirability by adding the clause that people might have to end up being satisfied with an explanation which doesn’t totally deliver on an explanation from Individualist action, that Methodological Individualism is an ideal whose value is that of pointing in a certain direction (Elster, 1985) However I do not see how this could be of any value, Elster speaks about curiosity and then inserts that we may have to be satisfied with certain results. This does not cure the curiosity of the situation, but merely puts a lid on it, I seek no other way of handling Elster’s argument by saying that it’s only way out is through atomism, which Elster does not want to commit himself to. Elster’s second argument for methodological individualism is that it improves our confidence in an alleged explanation, our beliefs that it does not rest on a spurious, non-explanatory explanation (Elster, 1989).

Elster’s second argument for methodological Individualism pertains to the boost to our confidence through an alleged explanation. Elster says that the temporal intervals between macro-phenomena are “empirically” longer then those that happen between micro-phenomena. Methodological Individualism allows for this temporal gap to be closed allowing for a more confident explanation

“By reducing the time span between explanans and explanandum, the risk of spurious explanation is also reduced. The latter risk arises in two main ways: by confusion of explanation and correlation and by the confusion of explanation and necessitation” (Elster, 196)

These risks occurs when (1) there is a third variable that generates both apparent cause and the apparent effect

(2) When the effect is brought about by some other cause that pre-empts the operation of the apparent cause.

In Elster’s ideal situation of using methodological individualism, both risks are reduced through approaching a continuous chain of cause and effect (Elster, 1989). This however seems to lead us into the same problem that we encountered in the first argument. The idea that confidence in one’s explanation should govern our ability to provide explanation just does not sit well within the confines of a methodological individualist schema, Just as the ‘aesthetic reason’ for using methodological individualism leads us to a atomist position, so to is our confidence in explanation. If by confidence, Elster means that the shorter the temporal intervals between phenomenal situations are more easily explained, then the most confidence in an explanation of social phenomena would be gained through the atomist position. The final argument that we shall examine of Elster’s in favour of methodological individualism is that a reduction of the social phenomena to individual actions is necessary to understand the stability and change of aggregates. Once again however, Elster fails to take into account that he cannot make these claims without fearing a reduction to an atomist account of explanation. While Jon Elster believes fundamentally that such a methodological process as methodological individualism is true, his arguments for why it is true fail to argue for methodological individualism itself, but argue instead for a reductionist explanation of social phenomena, the most radical of which is atomism; which all his arguments seem to be deducible to. if we look at the types of micro-foundations that they see as present within explanation of social phenomena, is not that a methodological individualism is wrong to conclude the many factors that it does conclude, but merely to say that given the multiple types of explanations that can be given through micro-foundation, it seems unreasonable to suggest that explanations should be removed if they do not conform to a methodological individualist model.

The idea that the social sciences should be concerned more with how the methodology that is being used makes sense in evidence of empirical data is found in Functionalism Vs. Rational Choice by Johannes Berger and Claus Offe, as a rejoinder to the debate between Cohen and Elster on the correct methodological process to use (in this case between Functional explanation and methodological Individualism) Berger and Offe argue firstly that methodological debates remain without a foundation if they are primarily being argued for strictly from methodology (Berger & Offe, 1982) but secondly it is important to understand why the argument is being made. The justification for the use of certain methodologies cannot be guaranteed upon theoretical analysis alone, but needs to be seen within the context of empirical data, however unfortunately we sometimes are not in a position to work with such empirical data and we must focus alone on theoretical analysis. In closing, while analytical Marxism identifies a useful path in the exploration of Marxian theory in explaining contemporary social phenomena, questions still need to be asked about its relation with the methodological process it uses in this exploration, specifically around questions about methodological individualism. In this paper I tried to point out that the assumptions made by Roemer and Elster about methodological Individualism fall short of their goal as a convincing argument made about the use of methodological individualism, and that such assumptions are a poor indication of its use. I think that the analytical Marxists are correct in identifying the substantive in Marx as what is fundamentally important, but this does not allow us to move away from critical engagement with methodological practices, and in many cases the question about methodology is the most crucial question to be asked.

---

[1] The debate within Analytical Marxism on methodological individualism can be thought of a continuation of the positivist debate that occurred in the 1950s between the Critical Rationalists and the Frankfurt School, What may be interesting to note is Elster’s admission that “most social scientists and social philosophers have come to accept the view as the truism it is” (Elster, 193) I do not share Elster’s enthusiasm for the truism of methodological individualism and view it as deeply flawed in many respects, some of which will be viewed in this paper.

[2] Elster and Roemer both find their rationale for providing a Marxian theory based on micro-foundations, that is one based on the analysis of the behaviour of individual actors, on a critique of the functionalism they say has perverted Marxian theory.

[3] While Torbjorn Tannsjo uses the phrasing Epistemic Individualism to describe the explanation of social phenomena to the level on the individual, I do not see how it differs from Methodological Individualism, as such I will continue to use methodological individualism unless referencing the material by Tannsjo. Elster uses the term interchangeable in his article Marxism and Individualism (1989)

[4] Elster also, in Marxism and Individualism (1989), wants to distinguish between political individualism and methodological individualism. Taking Schumpeter’s (1908) definition of political individualism that freedom contributes more than anything else to the development of man and to the general good is independent of methodological individualism “in the sense that all combinations of acceptance and rejection of the two are possible and coherent” (Elster, p201)

[5] Even without this quote from Elster’s Making Sense of Marx (1985) Elster can not be seen as a strong methodological individualist, if we turn once again to his article Marxism and Individualism he thinks that “an absurd and untenable version of MI is the view that social science could in principle eliminate all references to social wholes, collectivises, systems and the like. The objection to this view is well known and simple. When social aggregates are the object of individual beliefs and desires, one cannot always substitute, salva veritate, co-extensional individual referents” (Elster, 193)

[6] We have already to some extent explained what methodological individualism is, and later in the paper will be defining and reviewing what anti-reductionism is. Radical holism can be perhaps best explained as the anti-thesis to methodological individualism. Essentially, a radical holist will want to argue that individual relations are epiphenomenal in character that is they are a secondary characteristic of the explanation from a social level.